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Events in recent years have once again demonstrated 
the importance of developments on the housing mar-
kets, both for the economy as a whole and for financial 
stability.
From the mid-1990s, dynamic housing markets were a 
significant factor supporting sustained economic growth 
in most of the advanced economies. The low level of 
interest rates, financial innovations, flexible credit con-
ditions, sustained growth of disposable incomes, and 
demographic factors encouraged demand for housing 
and led to booming house prices and residential invest-
ment. Wealth effects combined, in some countries, 
with practices such as mortgage equity withdrawal also 
stimulated private consumption expenditure. However, at 
the same time, the household debt ratio reached unprec-
edented heights in some countries, making households 
extremely vulnerable to negative shocks.
House prices surged in the middle of the last decade. The 
problems which were already in evidence by 2006 in the 
subprime segment of the US housing market triggered an 
economic and financial crisis which plunged the global 
economy into the most serious recession since the end of 
World War II. The residential property bubbles also burst 
in other countries.
In some countries, the housing markets seem to have bot-
tomed out, and a number of indicators even suggest a 
hesitant recovery. Conversely, in other countries, prices are 
still falling and the correction of the excesses accumulated 
during the expansion phase continues to weigh heavily on 
economic growth. The reduction in the heavy debt level 
of households and the continuing decline in house prices 
are seriously inhibiting the recovery of domestic demand. 
Countries where the construction sector had become dis-
proportionately large before the crisis now also have to con-
tend with the fundamental restructuring of their economy.
Against that backdrop, the question is to what extent 
the house price correction is now over. To answer that, 
this article uses some simple benchmarks to examine the 
degree to which those prices are under- or overvalued. It 
concentrates mainly on the situation in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and a number of euro area countries, 
including Belgium. In that regard, in view of the sustained 
rise in house prices in the run-up to the crisis, the limited 
correction at the beginning of 2009, and the rapid return 
to positive growth, it seems that house prices are still over-
valued to a certain extent in Belgium. However, as these 
simple valuation methods have their limitations, the results 
must be interpreted with caution, and preferably in com-
bination with a detailed analysis of the factors specific to 
the various countries. Moreover, a number of risk factors 
persist and could jeopardise what is still a fragile recovery.54
Chart 1  rEal housE pricEs  (1)
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(1)  Nominal house prices deflated by the private consumption deflator.
(1)  The house price statistics analysed in this report come from the OECD. They 
are nominal house prices deflated by the private consumption deflator from 
the national accounts, so as to neutralise the influence of the movement in 
the general price level. From an economic angle, real house prices have the 
advantage of making it easy to establish a link with other real economic variables 
such as investment in housing.
This article is structured as follows. Section 1 analyses the 
characteristics of the latest house price and housing invest-
ment cycle. Section 2 highlights the factors which caused 
the rise over the past decade, some of the factors being 
global and others specific to particular countries. Section 3 
uses a number of indicators to measure the degree of 
under- or overvaluation of house prices. Section 4 exam-
ines the risk factors confronting the housing markets.
1.  Trends in house prices and housing 
investment
In the advanced countries, house prices  (1) tend to rise over 
a long period, the main reasons being growth of demand 
for housing due to the expansion of the population and 
the increase in real purchasing power, ever scarcer build-
ing land, building regulations and improvements to hous-
ing quality. However, there are numerous cyclical fluctua-
tions around this long-term trend. The last cycle began 
in the mid-1990s. In a number of countries, house prices 
first soared to unprecedented heights, then underwent a 
sharp downward correction from 2007 onwards.
In the OECD countries, this latest upward phase differs 
in several respects from the average cycle seen in those 
countries over the past few decades :
–   it extended over a good eleven years (from late 1996 
to the end of the first quarter of 2007), whereas the 
average length of a complete cycle was 6 ½ years, with 
3 ½ years in the upward phase.
–   the scale of the rise was exceptional. In the past, 
house prices have risen by 15  % on average. During 
1996-2007, however, they climbed by 44  %. The 
situation varied largely from one country to another, 
the   extremes being Japan (a 28  % fall) and Ireland   
(a 175  % rise). Apart from Ireland, the cumulative 
in  crease was very substantial in the United Kingdom, 
Spain and France, where prices more than doubled. At 
the same time, Belgium, Finland, the United States and 
the Netherlands – where the acceleration phase had 
set in earlier – also recorded sustained increases in real 
house prices, but to a lesser extent than in the first four 
above-mentioned countries ;
–   the increase in house prices was more widespread and 
synchronised than in previous cycles. Prices rose sharply 
in more than 75  % of the OECD countries, with the 55
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notable exception of Germany and Japan. During pre-
vious upward phases, that figure had tended to be only 
between 30 and 50 % ;
–   given the exceptional duration of the latest upward 
phase, the co-movement between real house prices 
and the economic cycle, which was a feature of previ-
ous cycles, was interrupted  : in particular, house prices 
continued to gain momentum despite the slackening 
pace of economic growth in the early 2000s.
During the course of the year 2007, the downward phase 
in the current cycle was triggered by the increase in inter-
est rates and the financial and economic crisis. Since 
then, house prices have fallen by 9  % on average in the 
advanced countries, a sharper decline than in the previous 
downward phases recorded since the 1970s.
Compared to the preceding upward phase, there has 
been less synchronisation between countries. In the 
United States, prices had already peaked in the fourth 
quarter of 2006. House sales had actually already begun 
to decline during 2005. The rise in interest rates is a 
significant explanatory factor, as the Federal Reserve 
increased its key policy rates by a total of 425 basis 
points between June 2004 and June 2006. Long-term 
interest rates also rose, though less steeply. Thus, aver-
age rates on mortgage loan agreements increased by 
around 100 basis points during this period. The slow-
down in economic growth in the United States from 
the second half of 2004 also played a role. Partly as a 
result of these factors, arrears on mortgage payments, 
and more specifically on subprime mortgage loans had 
already begun to increase during 2005. This develop-
ment was one of the reasons behind the financial crisis 
which erupted during the summer of 2007. In most 
other countries, the housing market correction did not 
begin until 2007 or 2008.
Prices thus entered a downward adjustment phase 
which varied in severity from one country to another. 
The cumulative price fall has exceeded 35  % in Ireland, 
with figures of between 15 and 20  % in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Spain. In France, the 
Netherlands and Finland, the cumulative price reduc-
tion was between 5 and 10 %. Finally, it is notable that 
in Belgium the real price correction was the shortest in 
time (2 consecutive quarters) and the smallest (–1.8 %). 
The developments recorded in the last few quarters 
further highlight the heterogeneous response of the 
housing markets after the crisis. Some countries – such 
as France, Finland and Belgium – were already in a stabi-
lisation or recovery phase during 2009 or 2010. In other 
countries, the price correction was still ongoing during 
the last quarter of 2010. 
It is interesting that the largest and most persistent 
adjustments today concern precisely some of the coun-
tries which had seen the most sustained price rises 
during the pre-crisis period, namely Spain and Ireland. 
Although a strong rise in house prices may in some cases 
be justified by the course of economic fundamentals, 
the increases recorded tend to suggest excessive devel-
opments which subsequently require greater and more 
permanent adjustment. 
A positive link is generally seen between the trend in 
house prices and investment in housing. The choice 
between buying an existing property or building a new 
home involves what is generally known as Tobin’s Q. This 
ratio compares prices on the secondary market with the 
cost of new building. An increase in the market value 
of existing properties compared to construction costs 
encourages investment in new buildings. Thus, hous-
ing investment also expanded strongly in most of the 
advanced countries in the decade from 2000. In Spain and 
Ireland, where the price rise was particularly steep, the 
expansion of housing investment began sooner and was 
extremely vigorous. In those two countries, the weight of 
the construction sector in total value added increased very 
rapidly. Elsewhere, and especially in the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands, housing investment 
expanded more modestly in comparison with the surge 
in prices. That indicates that there may be differences 
between countries in the sensitivity (or elasticity) of the 
housing supply to secondary market prices.
Chart 2  housing invEstmEnt














































The OECD recently estimated the long-term price elastic-
ity for a number of countries. According to the estimates, 
the supply of new housing is relatively more flexible in the 
United States, Finland and Ireland, whereas it is more rigid 
in continental European countries (such as Belgium) and 
the United Kingdom. The sensitivity of supply is consider-
ably influenced by government policy, such as urban plan-
ning and land use regulations. A positive shock affecting 
demand for housing will vary in its macroeconomic effects 
according to the degree of supply elasticity. When the 
activity of the construction sector reacts promptly and/
or strongly to the initial demand shock, the pressure on 
prices is tempered, but that tends to amplify the move-
ments in economic activity. When the supply of new hous-
ing is slow and/or weak in its response to rising demand, 
that tends to exacerbate the stress on prices, making 
them more volatile, with potentially negative implications 
for the affordability of housing.
The strong growth of housing investment was followed 
by a decline which set in sooner in the United States and 
Ireland than in the other countries. The crisis triggered a 
widespread slump in housing investment, but the scale 
of the decline varied between countries  ; it was much 
more severe in the countries where housing investment 
had risen the most, namely Ireland and Spain, and was 
also considerable in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. The adjustment in the United States, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom reduced housing investment to 
a level below that prevailing before the last housing cycle. 
In a number of advanced countries, governments intro-
duced measures to curb the collapse of the housing 
market, as part of the recovery plans following the eco-
nomic and financial crisis. Some of these measures con-
sisted of support for construction, via a reduction in VAT 
or the acceleration of social housing programmes  ; other 
measures were designed to assist households burdened 
by debt, such as the possibility of deferring interest pay-
ments on their mortgage loan in order to avoid default or 
an increase in the funds made available for reduced-rate 
loans. Some countries gradually withdrew these measures 
as the economic climate improved.
2.  Principal determinants of house 
prices
2.1  Theoretical considerations
In view of the mentioned short-term rigidity of supply, 
house prices tend to be determined more by demand 
in the short term, and even in the medium term. The 
number of households is the most obvious factor behind 
fluctuations in demand for housing. That in turn is influ-
enced by other demographic variables, such as household 
size and migratory flows. 
Households have a choice between renting or buying 
their home. That choice is made by comparing the user 
cost of purchasing and the rent. Investors, for whom the 
rent constitutes a return, weigh up the same options. The 
user cost comprises the interest charges on the value of 
the property, the cost of maintaining the property (includ-
ing taxes), and the gains or losses to be made on resale 
of the property. If the user cost of a house is significantly 
larger than the rent on an equivalent property, renting is 
preferable. House prices and rents obviously have a very 
great influence on this equation. The price-to-rent ratio 
is therefore a proxy for this balance, which has a stabilis-
ing effect on the two markets. The ratio is often used to 
measure the degree of under- or overvaluation of house 
prices (see below). However, various factors limit the 
substitution between the two types of housing, and the 
significance of this price-stabilising mechanism :
–   residential property transaction costs are often very 
high. In that regard, in a very flexible labour market, 
households may prefer to rent rather than buy ;
–   the tax treatment of house purchases is generally very 
favourable ;
–   the supply of (good-quality) houses for rent is often 
limited ;
–    in the case of renting, the time horizon is much shorter. 
Households therefore do not need to have an exact 
idea of their future position (over 10 to 20 years) in 
terms of disposable income, place of residence, house-
hold size, etc. That advantage is therefore all the more 
significant the greater the macroeconomic uncertainty ;
–   finally, in many cultures, even if the overall cost is the 
same, households prefer to own their home because 
of the associated social status or the freedom to do as 
they wish with the property.
Thus, rent and price are not the only two factors influenc-
ing a household’s decision whether to buy or rent a home. 
The other variables involved in that decision are :
–   the household’s disposable income  (1)  : a household 
must have the necessary financial resources to acquire 
a home. The ratio between house prices and disposable 
income, known in the literature as crude affordability, is 
often used to estimate the affordability of housing and 
(1)  Since the decision to buy concerns a long horizon, it is not current disposable 
income that matters, but permanent income, i.e. the average disposable income 
expected over the period of ownership of the property (or at least over the 
mortgage loan repayment period). Since the permanent income is not observable, 
current disposable income is generally used. But in that case, it is necessary to 
bear in mind that both its expected increase and its variance play a key role in 
shaping demand.57
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(1)  In this connection, the expected real interest rate over the term of the loan 
should ideally be taken as the basis, but since there is no reliable information 
available on long-term inflation expectations, it is common to use the nominal 
mortgage interest rates prevailing, adjusted for the change in the consumer price 
index over the past year.  
hence the degree of under- or overvaluation of house 
prices (see below) ;
–   the interest rate  (1), given that, in most cases, a loan 
is contracted in order to finance the purchase of a 
home. This variable refers more specifically to the cost 
of repaying a loan and, combined with the house 
price and disposable income, it gives an idea of the 
interest-adjusted-affordability ;
–   interest charges make up only part of the cost entailed 
in investing in housing. It is also necessary to take 
account of other costs, such as administrative expenses 
and the cost of maintaining the home, as well as the 
tax treatment of house purchases. These costs or tax 
advantages have to be compared with those associated 
with other types of real and financial investment ;
–   as already stated, the fact that a residential property is 
a real asset implies that its expected future yield may 
be a central factor affecting the decision to buy or 
keep the property. The expected variations in house 
prices therefore play a crucial role in demand. They 
may trigger further price rises, and create a process 
which ultimately generates speculative bubbles. In that 
regard, a number of studies have shown that house-
holds’ expectations are adaptive and in line with past 
trends in prices. Thus, while an increase in real prices 
may initially be justified by the fundamentals (interest 
rates, income, etc.), its continuation is often based on 
the expectation that the trend will be maintained. The 
current price rise therefore causes the future increase. 
The situation in Germany and Japan illustrates this 
mechanism in reverse. There, prices are expected to 
fall. The expected movement in house prices is one 
of the main reasons why the real price of houses may 
deviate from its   fundamental value for a lengthy period, 
in either direction. An upward trend may persist until 
an external factor triggers a sometimes dramatic fall 
in prices, going hand in hand with the contraction of 
demand for housing and the credit supply ; 
–   the expectations mechanism may be reinforced by its 
effect on bank credit, if, in a context of constantly rising 
prices, the banks also consider that they only face a 
small financial risk in the event of a repayment default. 
That may drive banks to relax their lending conditions 
(loan-to-value ratio, ratio between repayments and 
disposable income, duration of the loan, etc.). The 
functioning of credit markets is therefore a major factor 
influencing demand for housing. 
2.2  Global factors
The worldwide increase in house prices from the mid-
1990s onwards was due to both global factors and to 
country-specific factors. The importance of these two 
types of factors varies from one country to another.
2.2.1  Interest rates
The fall in interest rates was one of the main factors 
underpinning the residential property market. This trend 
occurred in the context of the decline in inflation which 
began after the 1970s and was attributable to the greater 
commitment of monetary policy to maintain price stabil-
ity, a more prudent fiscal policy and the liberalisation of 
the product and labour markets, which led to keener 
competition. The moderation of inflation and attenuation 
of its volatility contributed to a marked reduction in both 
nominal and real interest rates over that period. 
The steady decline in real interest rates is also due to 
excess savings at global level : the “saving glut”. Following 
the Asia crisis of 1997-1998, the accumulation of surplus 
savings by the emerging countries, especially China, and 
by the oil-exporting countries since the rise in oil prices 
during the 2000s, also depressed global interest rates.
The downward trend in interest rates at global level was 
combined with a process of convergence in nominal inter-
est rates at European level which mainly benefited the 







































































Source : Thomson Reuters Datastream.
(1)  Yield on 10-year government bonds, deflated by the CPI. 58
Chart 4  long-tErm dEBt  (1) of housEholds
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Sources : Federal Reserve, EC, ECB.
(1)  Outstanding amount in the 4th quarter of each year, except for 2010 (where the 
figures concern the 3rd quarter). For the United States: mortgage debt rather than 
total long-term debt. 
southern European countries. The announcement of the 
introduction of the euro encouraged the convergence of 
nominal long-term interest rates, which was almost totally 
achieved by 1998 in the case of the countries which were 
to adopt the euro in 1999. Taking account of inflation dif-
ferentials, many countries which had previously recorded 
higher real long-term interest rates than Germany saw the 
real rate fall below the German level. These differentials 
persisted until the financial crisis erupted in 2008. In those 
countries, the exceptionally low real interest rates gener-
ally fuelled the growth differential by supporting domestic 
demand and the rise in asset prices, particularly in the real 
estate sector.
2.2.2  Deregulation and financial innovation 
The deregulation of the financial markets from the early 
1980s also contributed to the expansion of the housing 
markets. The new products were a key factor here. Some 
developments on the credit markets were particularly 
significant in boosting the borrowing capacity of house-
holds, and therefore increasing their ability to buy, thus 
compensating for the price increases. Examples include :
–    extension of the loan term, up to 50 years in some coun-
tries such as France, Spain and the United Kingdom ;
–   increase in the loan-to-value ratio, which often excee-
ded the usual limit of 80  % in many countries. In the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, contracts were 
frequently concluded with a loan-to-value ratio of over 
100 % ;
–   wider use of variable-rate mortgages. With this type of 
loan, the initial advantage must be weighed up against 
the risk of a rise in rates ;
–   development of schemes for the repayment of the 
principal in a lump sum at the end of the loan period. 
Originally, these schemes were linked to an investment 
product intended to permit the ultimate repayment of 
the principal (as in the UK and the Netherlands). More 
recently, identical schemes but without any link to an 
investment product have also emerged (in Ireland and 
the United States) ;
–    development of mortgage equity withdrawal (mainly in 
the English-speaking countries) enabled households to 
relax their financing constraints by making flexible use 
of their home as collateral  : by mortgaging their home 
in whole or in part, they could obtain cheap credit to 
finance their consumption ;
–   finally, and above all, the development of securitisation 
and the originate-to-distribute model permitted the 
expansion of lending, especially in the United States. 
The originate-to-distribute model may have reduced the 
incentives for lenders to be diligent in performing their 
central function in the lending process : selection of the 
best risks and monitoring of the debtors. In the other 
OECD countries, the percentage of securitised mort-
gage loans was smaller, but with considerable variations 
between countries. However, in Europe, owing to the 
more stringent prudential framework, securitisation had 
a less detrimental effect on the incentives for banks.
An easing of lending conditions combined with very low 
interest rates has often led to a significant rise in house 
prices and long-term debts of households. The expansion 
of this debt (consisting mostly of mortgage debt) has 
been very marked in most of the OECD countries in recent 
years. At the end of 2010, the long-term debt of house-
holds exceeded 80  % of GDP in Spain, Portugal, Ireland 
and the Netherlands, and its growth between 2002 and 
2010 was often considerable in these countries. That debt 
expansion also increased the vulnerability of indebted 
households to shocks affecting their disposable income 
or interest rates, depending on the type of mortgage loan 
and the characteristics of the household. In some coun-
tries, easy access to credit also led to an increase in the 
proportion of owner occupiers, by enabling lower-income 
groups to borrow.
2.2.3  Disposable income
Between the mid-1990s and 2007, most of the developed 
economies experienced a period of “great moderation”, 
in which real average GDP growth gathered pace and its 59
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Chart 5  groWth and volatility of Economic 
activity 
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Source : OECD.
(1)  Percentage points.
volatility declined, compared to the period 1980-1995. 
Households revised their income expectations upwards 
and downgraded their expectations regarding economic 
uncertainty, leading to an increase in their permanent 
income. This factor bolstered demand for housing in most 
countries.
2.2.4  Demography
Demography has been another common factor behind 
the movement in house prices in most of the developed 
countries. Population growth, not least as a result of 
immigration, has shown a positive correlation with the 
rise in real prices in the OECD countries. On the contrary, 
Japan and Germany, where population growth was very 
low, have recorded a decline in real house prices. In the 
case of Ireland, the strong population growth was com-
bined with a structural effect caused by the age pyramid, 
since the proportion of the population reaching the age 
to set up a household increased sharply at the beginning 
of the 2000s.
The number of households also increased among the 
OECD countries during the period considered, because 
average household size has fallen as a result of the decline 
in the number of children per family, the increase in the 
proportion of single person households, and the increased 
independence of elderly persons.
Demand for housing by non-residents has also played a 
growing role in some European countries, such as France 
and Spain.
2.3  Country-specific factors
Regarding the latest upward phase in house prices, apart 
from the global factors listed above, there are also a 
number of national factors that should be mentioned. 
Furthermore, the impact of global factors has differed 
from one country to another. These factors are listed 
below for a selection of countries.
unitEd statEs
In the United States, the following factors have contrib-
uted to the price rise of recent years : 
–    in terms of both real disposable income per capita and 
demographics, the United States recorded a larger 
increase than most other advanced countries  : during 
the period between 1996 and 2007, annual growth 
averaged 2.3  % and 1  % respectively (compared to 
less than 2  % and 0.4  % respectively in the euro area, 
for example) ;
–   a number of complementary measures were taken to 
stimulate home ownership  : the capital gains made 
on the sale of a house were tax exempt under certain 
Chart 6  rEal housE pricEs and population

























































Sources : OECD, World Bank. 60
conditions from 1997 onwards, and the development 
of the non-conforming mortgage sector (Alt-A and 
subprime loans) was encouraged ;
–   after the bursting of the dotcom bubble in the year 
2000, the Federal Reserve made drastic cuts in the 
federal funds target rate, slashing it from 6.5  % in 
December 2000 to 1  % in June 2003, a monetary 
easing that was more pronounced than in other advan-
ced countries ; 
–   borrowing conditions on the mortgage market were 
relaxed considerably from 2003 onwards, more so 
than in other countries. This was due in particular 
to the following factors  : as mentioned above, the 
non-conforming sector gained in importance, criteria 
concerning income and collateral were eased (lenders 
focused more on the increase in the underlying value 
of the mortgaged property), a series of new practices 
(teaser rates – interest rates which are low at first but 
then increase considerably), and interest-only loans (in 
which during the initial phase of the loan only interest 
is paid) made loans more affordable, second mortgages 
proliferated, and there was a sharp increase in the loan-
to-value ratio on new loans ;  
–   strong speculative demand (primarily in large towns 
and fashionable resorts). It is estimated that this 
accounted for 15  % of total demand for housing, 
taking all purchases together in 2004, compared to a 
long-term average of 5 %.
However, the rise in house prices was curbed by the 
substantial, rapid increase in housing investment (high 
price elasticity) so that, overall, the house price rise in the 
United States during the period 1996 to 2006 was moder-
ate in comparison with the rest of the world.
gErmany
Germany is an atypical case. House prices there have 
tended to decline steadily over the past fifteen years, in 
sharp contrast with the increases elsewhere before 2007 
or 2008. At the same time, Germany has undergone a 
structural crisis in the building industry  : since the mid-
1990s, housing investment had been in constant decline, 
and only recently became stable. There are several factors 
which may account for these developments.
On the supply side, German reunification initially led to 
an acceleration in housing investment, leading to sur-
plus capacity (especially in the eastern Länder) from the 
mid-1990s onwards. There followed a lengthy process of 
adjustment which was reflected in the weakness of the 
construction sector.
On the demand side, in comparison with other European 
countries, there were few innovations in mortgage 
products, the only major change being the extension 
of the loan repayment period to 30 years. Changes in 
the disposable income of German households may also 
be part of the explanation for the sluggishness of the 
housing market. During the decade preceding the crisis, 
as a result of the slowing pace of employment growth, 
household disposable income increased more slowly than 
in other European economies. Also, the percentage of 
home owners in Germany is particularly low, whereas the 
rental market accounts for a substantial proportion of 
residential property, making it more attractive and tend-
ing to moderate the demand for properties to buy. Finally, 
in regard to taxation, while a tax allowance for first-time 
buyers (Eigenheimzulage) was introduced in 2004, it was 
withdrawn altogether in 2006. Also, in 2007, the general 
increase in the VAT rate by 3  % to 19  % drove up the 
cost of new buildings. Finally, the low rate of population 
growth is another factor which has depressed demand 
for housing. 
spain
Until 2007, the Spanish housing market boom was one 
of the most notable in the euro area. One of the main 
explanatory factors was the very strong surge in house-
hold disposable income, as a result of economic catching-
up after the country joined the European Union. Income 
growth was also supported by vigorous expansion of 
employment, encouraged by labour market reforms. In 
addition, interest rates there fell very sharply, consider-
ably improving access to credit. In fact, Spain clearly 
benefited from the convergence of its nominal interest 
rates in anticipation of its accession to EMU, and – as a 
result of its inflation gap in relation to the euro area aver-
age – it enjoyed a decline in real interest rates even after 
the introduction of the euro. The decline in interest rates 
probably played a non-negligible role in the increase in 
household debt levels, thus fuelling the expansion of the 
housing market. Moreover, the change in the mortgage 
landscape brought about by the introduction of product 
innovations (for example, the possibility of extending the 
loan term to 50 years), the deregulation of the banking 
sector and a tax regime which encouraged the purchase 
of houses (such as the various tax allowances for buyers, 
and a special lower VAT rate of 7  % on the purchase of 
new housing) facilitated and stimulated home owner-
ship. Finally, the demographic factor was particularly 
important in Spain, where European non-residents and 
the influx of immigrants have provided additional sup-
port for demand. 61
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francE
Up to 2007, the French housing market was among the 
most flourishing in the euro area. Demand was under-
pinned in particular by the dynamism of incomes and 
employment, in line with the implementation of policies 
targeting the labour market. Moreover, the home owner-
ship rate, which was relatively low, has tended to rise and 
has boosted demand for housing. Demand from European 
non-residents also drove up prices, though not on a 
comparable scale to what happened in Spain. As in other 
countries, a number of innovations appeared on the mort-
gage market, such as the possibility of extending the term 
of the loan to 50 years, and the increased use of variable-
rate loans, easing credit conditions. Moreover, financing 
sources subsidised by the State supported buyers’ demand 
for housing, e.g. via the Prêt à Taux Zéro (zero-rate loan) 
already introduced in 1995 and then relaunched in 2005, 
making home ownership easier for first-time buyers with 
modest incomes. In 2007, just before the end of the 
boom, a tax credit on loan interest was introduced. 
irEland
During the upward phase in the latest property cycle, 
Ireland appeared to be an outsider, with prices almost 
tripling since 1996 despite substantial investment in 
housing. The steep increase in prices was due to strong 
demand which outstripped that in the rest of the euro 
area, one of the root causes being demographic trends  : 
strong growth of a young population, net immigration, 
and changes associated with lifestyles (break-up of the 
nuclear family). In addition, from the 1990s onwards, a 
twofold catching-up effect occurred, not only in regard to 
the disposable income of households, but also directly in 
respect of housing prices which were relatively lower than 
those of Ireland’s European neighbours. Moreover, the tax 
rules favoured the acquisition of houses. The financing 
constraints facing households were eased, and that may 
have stimulated demand for mortgage loans. On the one 
hand, the process of convergence with the prospect of 
Ireland’s entry into EMU led to a fall in nominal and real 
interest rates, making it substantially cheaper to borrow. 
Also, the mortgage loan market was liberalised and 
deregulated during the 1980s and 1990s. However, while 
such innovations were also present on other European 
markets, in Ireland the aggressive marketing of mortgages 
encouraged record levels of private debt. The business 
model of the Irish banking sector in fact differs from other 
European models in its over-exposure to the residential 
housing market. The fact that the high degree of finan-
cial openness in Ireland attracts a large volume of capital, 
plus recourse to international wholesale funding, enabled 
the financial sector to access a pool of abundant liquidity 
and thus expand the supply of credit. The financial sector 
consequently came to represent an exceptionally large 
proportion of the Irish economy as a whole.
nEthErlands
The Netherlands initially saw a period of rapidly rising 
house prices in the second half of the 1990s, followed 
by a more moderate rise during the 2000s. During the 
earlier period, the expansion of the housing market had 
been accompanied by strong job creation and a sus-
tained growth of household disposable incomes. During 
the whole period, the price boom was also encouraged 
by the growing competition between mortgage lend-
ers, and by developments on this market (such as the 
increased recourse to variable-rate loans). In addition, the 
loan-to-value ratio is particularly high in the Netherlands 
(approaching 100  %) compared to other euro area coun-
tries (where the average was 79  % in 2007). An accom-
modating tax regime, notably via a tax credit on loan 
interest, also acted as an incentive to taking on mortgage 
debts. All these factors may have contributed to the accu-
mulation of record levels of mortgage debt by households 
in the Netherlands compared to their neighbours in the 
euro area. As in France, the increase in the particularly 
low percentage of owner-occupiers compared to other 
countries (such as Belgium, Spain, and Ireland) may have 
fuelled the rise in house prices compared to rents.
unitEd kingdom
The specific features of the United Kingdom’s housing 
market concern both supply and demand. First, the supply 
of housing is particularly price inelastic, the main reason 
being the tight control on supply by strict land use regula-
tions and urban planning rules. The fact that these rules 
are passed mainly at local level explains their restrictive 
character, since local residents may have an interest in 
limiting the increased density of housing in their district. 
In 2004, a parliamentary commission of inquiry published 
a report on this subject (the Barker Report) which makes 
recommendations on increasing the supply of new hous-
ing and, more generally, making the housing market more 
flexible.
While supply was limited, a number of specific factors 
helped to support demand for housing and accentuated 
the price rises. As in the United States, the disposable 
income of British households grew more strongly than in 
most other advanced countries. Moreover, households’ 
access to credit was made particularly easy by financial 
deregulation, which was both early and very far-reaching, 
and by fierce competition between credit institutions, 
leading to very flexible credit conditions.62
This limited supply of housing coupled with demand 
strongly buttressed by an aggressive credit supply made 
the British situation similar to that in the Netherlands. 
In both countries, house price fluctuations exceeded the 
average in the other advanced economies.
BElgium
In Belgium, some specific factors contributed to the 
rise in house prices during the decade preceding the 
economic crisis, and more particularly during the period 
2004-2007.
First, changes in residential property taxes tended to 
favour access to ownership and stimulate the number of 
transactions. For instance, registration fees were reduced 
in Flanders and Brussels in 2002 and 2003  (1) ; in Flanders, 
the cut in registration fees was accompanied by fee 
  portability, encouraging (young) households to invest rela-
tively early in their first property, even if they later switch 
to a more expensive property as their income increases 
sufficiently to make it affordable. Moreover, the fact that 
cadastral income on existing properties is hardly affected 
by changes in the market tends to reinforce the bias in 
favour of existing dwellings rather than new.
Second, the tax amnesty (DLU  /  EBA) applied in 2005 
encouraged Belgian households to repatriate funds, and 
part of that was certainly reinvested in residential prop-
erty. That factor is behind the marked rise in personal 
contributions towards house purchases since 2005.
Third, the Federal State and the Regions introduced tax 
incentives to improve the energy efficiency of residential 
buildings. These measures had the effect of increas-
ing the amounts invested by households in renovating 
their homes. In 2008 and 2009, when house building 
recorded a marked decline, which persisted in 2010, 
albeit to a smaller extent, the amount invested in 
renovation continued to increase at a sustained rate. 
Renovation enhances the quality of the properties, 
boosting their resale value. 
3.  Measures for the assessment of 
house prices
3.1  General
The empirical literature refers to a number of methods 
of linking changes in house prices to changes in the fun-
damental determinants, permitting an assessment of the 
residential property market valuation. 
The first approach compares the movement in prices with 
the change in disposable income (price-to-income), so as 
to reveal the affordability. This yardstick can be adjusted 
to take account of the movement in interest rates (and 
more specifically, mortgage interest rates), since they 
have a big influence on the repayment cost and hence 
on the borrowing capacity of individuals. This is the 
concept of interest-adjusted-affordability. In addition, the 
influence of demographic factors – population growth 
exerts upward pressure on house prices if the supply is 
constant – can be introduced into such a yardstick, which 
will then cover the main macroeconomic determinants of 
demand for housing.
The second approach compares house prices with rents 
(price-to-rent), to gauge how a person wanting a home 
decides between house purchase and rental. 
In the long term, these ratios (price-to-income, price-
to-rent, interest-adjusted-affordability) tend to revert to 
their equilibrium value, while in the short (and medium) 
term they may deviate from it to varying degrees. Large 
deviations from the equilibrium value of these ratios 
therefore point to under- or overvaluation of house 
prices. Thus, if the price and/or repayment cost associ-
ated with the house increases relative to households’ 
disposable income, it is much harder for them to buy a 
property, their demand declines, and that drives prices 
down, causing the ratio to revert to its equilibrium value. 
Similarly, if house prices rise much faster than rents, it 
becomes more attractive for potential buyers to rent, 
driving up rents while prices on the secondary market 
tend to fall. 
The most important advantage of these methods lies 
mainly in the simplicity of calculation and in the fact 
that they are based on macroeconomic data published 
in the relatively short term, available for a large number 
of countries. International institutions (OECD, ECB, 
IMF) also refer frequently to the concepts of price-to-
income and price-to-rent in their analysis of the housing 
markets.
But these tools also suffer from many defects, so that the 
findings must be interpreted with caution. First, they take 
no account of some key determinants of house prices, 
and approximate values often have to be used for others : 
this applies to taxation (for example, the deductibility of 
borrowing costs, which supports the affordability of hous-
ing), the characteristics of mortgage contracts (a longer 
(1)  In Wallonia, registration fees were not reduced until 2009.63
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(1)  More specifically, as regards the measure which links the movement in prices to 
the movement in rents, there is an important conceptual difference in that the 
house price (in the numerator) is calculated on the basis of new transactions on 
the secondary market and therefore reflects market conditions, while rents (in the 
denominator) correspond – particularly in Belgium – to the rent component of the 
HICP, and usually reflect the movement in rents under existing rather than new 
leases. Existing rents are generally linked to the health index and are subject to 
various legal rules limiting increases during a multi-annual contract.
(2)  Regarding the loan-to-value ratio, the pattern in Belgium seems to have differed 
from that in other countries, as that ratio has declined over the past 15 years. 
Whereas the loan-to-value ratio hovered around 80 % from 1996 to 2004, it 
began to fall rapidly from 2005, dropping to 65 % in the first half of 2010. In 
other words, the personal contribution towards a house purchase increased from 
around 20 % in the mid-2000s to 35 % in recent years. One of the reasons often 
cited to account for this trend is the repatriation of funds under the tax amnesty 
(DLU/EBA) implemented in 2005, part of those funds having been reinvested in 
residential property. It must also be stressed that the developments discussed 
above were seen on average. The increase in the average personal contribution 
over the past 15 years does not exclude the fact that for an increasing amount of 
households a home has become less affordable.
loan term or a higher loan-to-value ratio increases afford-
ability), rents  (1), etc.
Second, the concept of the equilibrium value, used to 
measure the scale of the under- or overvaluation, is itself 
difficult to establish. A long-term average is generally 
used for this purpose, but on the one hand, that aver-
age value depends on the period considered, and on the 
other, there is no guarantee that the equilibrium value 
will be constant over time. That applies in particular if 
there are changes over time in the tax rules, the opera-
tion of the mortgage markets (loan-to-value ratio, matu-
rity, etc.), or the preferences of the parties involved. As 
already mentioned, the developments on the mortgage 
markets over the past decade led, among other things, 
to an extension of the loan term and an increase in the 
loan-to-value ratio. For example  (2), the average loan term 
in Belgium was traditionally estimated at 20 years, but 
data from the Central Individual Credit Register, which 
records all new contracts for mortgage loans granted 
to resident households, broken down by their term and 
their average amount, suggest that the term is increas-
ing. Thus, in 2007, the average duration of mortgage 
contracts for a sum between € 100 000 and € 150 000 
was estimated at 266 months, or 22.2 years, reflecting 
an increase in the average term during the period pre-
ceding the crisis. Thereafter, the average term seems to 
have stopped increasing, standing at just under 22 years 
in 2010.
Finally, these methods supply ex-post valuation indicators, 
but do not show whether any deviations may give rise to 
substantial corrections in the near future. 
In view of the above, it is better to draw lessons from 
these methods to assess the change in the affordability of 
housing rather than the level of affordability. Comparisons 
between countries must also adopt that approach.
Table  1  Measures of house price overvaluation : international coMparison
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Ratio between  
house price  
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Ratio between  
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and rent
 
Ratio between  
house price  
and disposable  
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adjusted for  
the interest rate  
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growth
 
United Kingdom   ........ 20 22 –17 –8 29 42 –2
France  ................ 47 1 48 13 36 42 13
Belgium  ............... – – – – 48 66 15
Spain  ................. 28 1 22 14 25 35 –12
Ireland  ................ – – – – 7 22 –30
Netherlands   ............ 21 7 25 6 41 38 6
Finland  ................ 4 6 22 10 3 39 –15
Italy  .................. 20 13 10 9 18 7 –9
United States  .......... – – – – –8 7 –25
Germany  .............. –28 –1 –13 –2 –24 –21 –
Japan  ................. – – – – –36 –36 –
Sources : ECB (2011), OECD, NBB (own calculations).
(1)  1980-2010 average for the ECB and OECD indicators ; 1995-2010 average for the NBB indicator.
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(1)  These estimates are based on assumptions of an average maturity of 20 years 
and a loan-to-value ratio of 80 %. Results are expressed in deviation from 
the 1995-2010 average.
3.2  International comparison 
Recently, the OECD and the ECB have both assessed the 
housing markets in a number of countries in the light of 
the affordability indicators. The Bank has made similar cal-
culations on the basis of an interest-adjusted-affordability 
model  (1). As table 1 shows, the findings may vary substan-
tially according to the indicators. Compared to their long-
term value, these results indicate that, for Belgium on 
average, in the third and fourth quarters of 2010, house 
prices were overvalued by between 15 and 66 %, depend-
ing on the approach adopted. This demonstrates the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding these measurements. 
On the basis of the approaches linking the movement in 
house prices to disposable incomes or rents, disregard-
ing interest rates, an international comparison shows 
that Belgium is among the most overvalued European 
countries (between 48 and 66  %). Prices also seem to be 
seriously overvalued in France (36 to 48  %), Spain (22 to 
35  %) and the Netherlands (21 to 41  %). Conversely, in 
Germany, Japan and – according to one of the indica-
tors – the United States, prices appear to be below their 
equilibrium value. The introduction of interest rates into 
the equation reduces the overvaluation of these prices by 
about ten percentage points on average in the countries 
with overvaluation.  In Belgium, the overvaluation of resi-
dential property would then come down to around 15 %.   
In Belgium, it appears that housing became seriously less 
affordable between 2004 and the third quarter of 2008, 
mainly on account of the price surge ; in September 2008, 
house prices were almost 25  % overvalued. The afford-
ability of housing then improved rapidly between the 
end of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, despite the 
slower pace of household disposable income growth, as 
prices on the secondary market increased more slowly and 
then declined, and interest rates fell sharply. Just under 
half of the cumulative overvaluation since 2004 was thus 
reabsorbed. From the second half of 2009, the afford-
ability of housing remained more or less stable, as the rise 
in prices was offset by the continuing decline in interest 
rates. However, since the third quarter of 2010, there have 
been signs of a renewed deterioration in the affordability 
of housing, owing to the price rebound, while interest 
rates have begun to increase slightly. 
4.  Risk factors
4.1  General risk factors
Despite the price correction which has already taken 
place, and the gradual consolidation of economic growth 
in many countries, a number of risk factors at global level 
could weigh on the housing markets in the short and 
medium term.
The first is the return to more normal interest rates. In the 
past decade, interest rates have been very low as a result 
of various factors already mentioned, such as the highly 
accommodating monetary policy and excess savings in 
the emerging Asian economies and the oil-exporting 
countries. That was accompanied by an increase in the 
debt level of the non-financial private sector, particularly 
households, and an accumulation of macroeconomic 
imbalances in numerous economies. The eruption of the 
financial crisis led to a renewed easing of monetary con-
ditions at global level. Establishing a new, more balanced 
growth model at global level will involve, in particular, a 
return to more normal monetary policies and real interest 
rates, both short- and long-term. That will naturally have 
a dampening impact on recourse to mortgages, demand 
for which is likely to fall, and drive up the cost of repaying 
variable-rate loans, implying a risk of rising default rates in 
countries where that type of loan is common.
The second risk factor concerns potential GDP growth, 
which could prove to be lower than in the previous 
decade. A decline in potential growth causes a slow-
down in disposable income of households and depresses 
demand for housing. The two main reasons for a reduc-
tion in potential growth are as follows :
1.   The normalisation of interest rates already mentioned 
could restrain investment compared to the pre-crisis 
period. That effect could be reinforced by the essential 
process of deleveraging, which could limit the supply 
of credit by financial institutions.
2.   If the rise in unemployment triggered by the crisis 
becomes permanent (hysteresis), that could lead to 
the destruction of human capital. High and persistent 
uncertainty on the labour market also applies a direct 
brake on demand for housing.
Finally, the financial crisis led to a rapid rise in govern-
ment debt levels in most of the advanced economies. 
The sustainability of public finances requires speedy cor-
rection of budget deficits. That may imply an economic 
slowdown in the short term, and will probably depress 
the disposable income of households. However, that risk 
should not be exaggerated  : fiscal consolidation may also 65
End of thE crisis in thE housing markEts ?
an intErnational survEy
boost household and business confidence, providing sup-
port for consumption and investment respectively. In the 
medium term, this positive effect on aggregate demand 
(crowding-in) could outstrip the recessive effects of the 
consolidation.
4.2  Specific risk factors
This section addresses the risk factors specific to the 
American and Belgian housing markets.
4.2.1  United States
The valuation analysis shows that, if account is taken of 
a number of fundamental factors, such as disposable 
income or rents, house prices in the United States are cur-
rently quite close to their equilibrium level. Taking account 
of interest rate levels, house prices are even well below 
this equilibrium. In those circumstances, the housing 
sector could be expected to recover. While government 
measures nurtured a recovery between the spring of 2009 
and the spring of 2010, once most of the support meas-
ures expired, activity and prices both subsided. Since the 
financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 originated on 
the US housing market and had a serious impact there, 
the government had taken numerous measures at the 
time to support that sector  (1).
At present, the American housing sector is still not show-
ing signs of a lasting recovery. It is thus one of the few 
sectors which has not contributed to the current eco-
nomic revival, whereas in the past it was always one of 
the engines of recovery. Several important factors are still 
impeding the recovery today.
First, the stock of unsold houses is currently substantial. 
One reason is that supply is very elastic to prices in the 
United States, so that the supply responded (too) sharply 
to the fluctuation in underlying demand. A BIS simulation 
shows that, taking account of the changes at the level 
of certain fundamental data (real per capita disposable 
income and population), the excess supply during the 
period 2000-2006 can be estimated at 1.1  % of GDP  (2). 
Thus, while the stock of unsold houses stood at around 
2 million homes in 2000, the figure climbed to over 
4 million on more than one occasion in recent years. 
Expressed in monthly sales, the stock increased from 
around 4 months to more than 8 months. Apart from 
this backlog, it is necessary to take account of the homes 
that are likely to come onto the market shortly. This 
“shadow inventory” can be calculated on the basis of the 
total mortgage loans significantly in arrears (90 days or 
more) and foreclosures. The shadow inventory is currently 
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estimated at over 2 million homes. Finally, the price falls 
seen in recent years have taken a good many mortgaged 
houses into negative equity (when the amount outstand-
ing on the mortgage exceeds the market value of the 
property) by reducing the underlying market value of 
the property. The “non-recourse” scheme  (3) applicable in 
some States may tempt some households to terminate 
their mortgage loan and assign their home to their mort-
gage agency. According to the available figures for the 
third quarter of 2010, loans in negative equity could make 
up almost 25 % of the total.
Also, a second risk factor threatening the housing market 
is the uncertainty currently surrounding the reform of this 
sector. The crisis has in fact demonstrated that structural 
changes are needed in the way in which this market 
operates. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has thus 
made several suggestions to encourage in-depth reform 
of the US mortgage markets  (4). A number of international 
(1)  Apart from initiatives such as a reduction in key interest rates and the provision of 
abundant, flexible liquidity for credit institutions and financial markets, initiatives 
which also benefited the housing sector, the Federal Reserve introduced a 
number of targeted measures designed specifically to reduce the interest rates on 
mortgage loans and improve the functioning of the credit markets (takeover of 
part of the debt of the government-sponsored US mortgage finance companies, 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and purchase of a substantial volume of 
mortgage-backed securities from those agencies). The federal government also 
took a number of important measures. The Making Home Affordable programme 
made it easier to repay mortgage loans, notably by rescheduling the cost of 
the loan. In 2009, a tax credit for house purchase was also introduced. It was 
abolished in the spring of 2010. 
(2)  Ellis L. (2008) shows that housing investment in the United States represented 
4.9 % of GDP, on average, during this period compared to an estimated 3.8% on 
the basis of the fundamentals.
(3)  This means that, in a negative equity situation, the lender cannot demand 
repayment of the total amount of the loan, but only the value of the underlying 
residential property.
(4)  See f.e. Hoenig T. (2010).66
(1)  IMF (2010c), OECD (2010b).
(2)  Department of the Treasury, Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(2011).
(3)  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored mortgage finance 
companies which dominate much of the US mortgage market.
institutions, such as the IMF and the OECD, have also 
put forward various proposals for reforming the housing 
policy  (1). In recent years, it has in fact become apparent 
that, in comparison with the situation in other countries, 
the current system of government support is complex, 
expensive and poorly targeted, if the aim is to encourage 
home ownership and to ensure that housing is afford-
able. In an international perspective, the percentage 
of home ownership in the United States is not in fact 
exceptionally high. In mid-February 2011, the US Treasury 
Secretary announced a government plan to reform the 
mortgage market  (2). The main aspect of this plan concerns 
the removal of government involvement via the gradual 
dismantling of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  (3). The plan 
also includes proposals for improving the operation of the 
mortgage market and assigning a new role to the govern-
ment in the housing sector. Congress has yet to decide on 
these proposals.
4.2.2  Belgium
As in some other European countries, such as France 
and Finland, the housing market in Belgium featured a 
limited price correction during the financial crisis and a 
certain level of overvaluation, according to a number of 
indicators. In that context, the question is whether the 
factors which have hitherto helped to underpin prices will 
continue to exert such an influence in the future. Some 
of these factors which had contributed to that support in 
the mid-2000s could go into reverse. In that regard, apart 
from the general risks already mentioned, and especially 
the prospect of an interest rate rise, the following risks 
should be noted :
–   an increase in residential property taxes, via a reform 
of cadastral incomes or a reduced allowance for loan 
expenses, might be envisaged, especially in a context 
of long-term fiscal consolidation. That would be in 
line with the recommendations of certain international 
institutions (particularly the OECD) ; 
–   certain measures providing support for renovation and 
building have already been scaled down or even abo-
lished, and that process could be intensified, curbing 
housing investment and particularly expenditure on 
renovation. 
Conversely, other factors could continue to support prices 
in the medium term :
–   the general economic outlook, and hence the outlook 
for unemployment and household disposable income, 
now looks fairly positive in Belgium, and slightly better 
than the euro area average ;
–   although the household debt level has continued to 
rise in Belgium over the past two years – in contrast to 
the euro area, where the level has been stable since the 
beginning of 2009 –, it is still low (55 % of GDP at the 
end of 2010) in comparison with the euro area (65  % 
of GDP) ;
–    the mortgage loan default rate has so far been relatively 
low. After having declined in 2007 and up to mid-2008, 
reaching a low point of 1.65  %, the default rate clim-
bed back in the second half of 2008, in 2009, and up 
to April 2010 when it stood at 1.72 %. Since then, the 
default rate has edged downwards, reaching 1.67 % in 
April 2011.
Finally, the influence of certain factors on the future 
dynamics of house prices is uncertain :
–   in addition to the likely interest rate rise, banks might 
consider tightening their (other) lending criteria (dura-
tion of the loan, loan-to-value ratio, collateral required, 
etc.). As already mentioned, the data reported by the 
banks to the Central Individual Credit Register show 
that the average term of new mortgage loans stopped 
increasing in 2008, and has even tended to decline. 
Nevertheless, the latest results of the bank lending 
survey for Belgian banks show no perceptible tighte-
ning of mortgage lending standards. The refocusing of 
banks on their core business is certainly a factor sup-
porting mortgage activity ;
–    according to the Federal Planning Bureau’s demo  gra  phic 
outlook, the annual rise in the total population over the 
Chart 8  mortgagE loan dEfault ratE in BElgium
(in % of outstanding contracts  (1))















Source : NBB (Central Individual Credit Register).
(1)  Based on the number of contracts.67
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next ten years, on average, will be higher (at 0.64  % 
per annum) than in the previous fifteen years (0.45  % 
per annum). The population group aged between 25 
and 44 years, more representative of potential property 
buyers, contracted in the past ten years but should 
begin to expand from 2013. Finally, the number of 
households could continue to grow more strongly than 
the population in general, in view of the structural 
trend towards a reduction in household size ;
–   also, the supply of housing could increase temporarily 
in 2011 and 2012, as the building permits issued in 
2010 take effect, partly as a result of the VAT reduction 
– which has now been abolished – on the first € 50,000 
tranche of construction invoices. If demand for housing 
were to slow down at the same time (e.g. owing to a 
rise in interest rates), that could amplify the deflationary 
effect on prices.
Conclusion
The latest house price cycle, which began in the mid-
1990s in most of the advanced countries, is different 
from previous cycles in its exceptional duration, scale and 
synchronisation. The low level of interest rates, financial 
innovations, easy credit conditions and demographic fac-
tors bolstered demand for housing and caused a strong 
surge in house prices and residential investment. The rise 
in house prices was most marked in the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Ireland and France. Prices also recorded a sig-
nificant, albeit smaller, rise in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Finland and the United States. In Spain and Ireland, 
this rise clearly stimulated the demand for new hous-
ing and activity in the construction sector, which came 
to represent an exceptionally large proportion of total 
value added. At the same time, the household debt ratio 
reached unprecedented heights, making households vul-
nerable to negative shocks.
House markets overheated in the middle of the last 
decade. The problems already apparent in 2006 on the 
subprime segment of the American housing market trig-
gered an economic and financial crisis which plunged the 
global economy into the most serious recession since the 
end of World War II. The residential property bubbles also 
burst in other countries.
Compared to what had happened during the upward 
phase of the cycle, the synchronisation of price move-
ments between countries diminished. Thus, in some coun-
tries – namely Belgium, Finland, France – prices bottomed 
out and began rising again in the second half of 2009. 
Conversely, prices are still falling in Spain, Ireland and 
the Netherlands. The excesses accumulated during the 
expansion period are clearly depressing economic growth. 
Thus, the reduction in the heavy household debt level and 
the fall in house prices are still curbing the dynamism of 
domestic demand in a number of countries. Spain and 
Ireland also face the difficult challenge of restructuring 
their economy on account of the malaise afflicting the 
construction sector.
This article has used a series of simple indicators to 
examine the degree to which house prices are under- or 
overvalued. If account is taken of fundamental factors like 
disposable income, population growth and the current 
extremely low level of interest rates (interest-adjusted-
affordability), house prices do not seem to be too far away 
from their equilibrium value in most countries. However, 
they are still overvalued to a certain extent in Belgium. 
Nevertheless, these simple methods have their limitations, 
so that the results must be interpreted with caution. Also, 
it is possible that the current low level of interest rates 
– which accounts for the relatively good affordability of 
housing – may in reality cease to be a good approxima-
tion of general conditions for access to credit, which have 
been tightened considerably since the crisis in most coun-
tries. Normalisation of the level of interest rates is also one 
of the main risk factors for the housing market, in addi-
tion to the uncertainty over a possible negative impact of 
the crisis on potential growth and the consequences of 
the consolidation of public finances.
Although it is evident from this analysis that the decline in 
house prices in the United States was enough to correct 
the past imbalances, one can expect a number of factors 
to continue to impede the recovery of the housing market 
in the short to medium term. Thus, a large actual and 
hidden stock of unsold houses still remains, and there is 
uncertainty over the reform of the American mortgage 
markets, while the high unemployment rate continues 
to dent the confidence of American households. Where 
Belgium is concerned, the essentially fiscal factors which 
supported prices during the past decade will probably 
not have the same effect in the future. Conversely, the 
general economic conditions remain sound, in regard to 
both income and debt levels of households. In this uncer-
tain context, however, the developments of the housing 
market will still need to be regularly monitored.
Finally, the crisis has undeniably highlighted the need for 
better supervision of the financial sector and stricter regu-
lation. Several initiatives have already been taken to that 
end at global and European level. International institu-
tions such as the IMF and the OECD have also addressed 
recommendations to various countries aimed at reforming 
the housing policy and the operation of the mortgage and 
housing markets.68
Moreover, the public debt crisis which has shaken the 
euro area since 2010 has led to the establishment of 
stronger economic governance in the European Union. 
It has in fact become clear that, to prevent excesses and 
ensure the stability of EMU, it is essential to strengthen 
fiscal, structural and macroeconomic governance in the 
EU. Apart from stronger budgetary discipline, via rein-
forcement of the stability and growth pact, a new 
mechanism for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances 
and competitiveness will become a vital pillar of this new 
economic governance. In the preventive stage of this new 
mechanism, the risks will be assessed annually by means 
of a warning signal based on a scoreboard comprising a 
small number of indicators. Recent history has shown that 
housing markets can be a key factor not only in imbal-
ances but also in divergences between countries  : the 
early detection of bubbles forming on these markets is 
thus crucial. For this reason, the movement in real house 
prices could be incorporated in this scoreboard. The vul-
nerability of the private sector could be assessed by the 
ratio between the private sector’s debt level and GDP, or 
by the expansion of lending to the private sector.69
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